Bitcoin has attracted considerable attention from governments, banks, as well as researchers. However, Bitcoin is not a completely anonymous system. All transaction information in the Bitcoin system is published on the network and can be used to reveal the identity of the user by transaction correlation analysis. In this paper, a secure and privacy-preserving mix service for Bitcoin anonymity, Lockmix, is proposed. Lockmix introduces mix servers to provide a mix service for the user by using blind signature and multi-signature schemes to prevent attackers from linking the input address with the output address. Lockmix provides anonymity, scalability, accountability, Bitcoin compatibility and anti-theft. Lockmix has been implemented on a Bitcoin test network, and experiments show that our solution is efficient.
Introduction
In 2008, a paper titled "A peer-to-peer electronic cash system" [1] was published by Nakamoto Satoshi, which opened a new era of digital currency.
Traditional centralized digital currencies are vulnerable to DoS attacks and Sybil attacks [2] . Unlike previous digital currencies, Bitcoin does not need to rely on a specific 1 monetary institution. It consists of miner nodes and normal nodes. It uses the proof of work [1] mechanism to issue currency, and the miner node packages the correct transactions into blocks by collecting and publishing them to the P2P network while obtaining the corresponding mining reward. At the same time, the hash algorithm in cryptography guarantees the data integrity in the Bitcoin system. The digital signature algorithm is used for the user's Bitcoin account design. The public key corresponds to the user's Bitcoin address, and the private key corresponds to the "key" to a Bitcoin address. The Bitcoin transaction process is shown in Fig. 1 .
In the Bitcoin system, the total amount of Bitcoin is 21 million, which is set by the Bitcoin software parameters written by Nakamoto Satoshi. The miner will receive 50 Bitcoins when he successfully publishes a block. Bitcoin rewards will cut in half every four years. At the time of writing, the reward for each block is 12.5 Bitcoins, and by 2020 it will be reduced to 6.25 Bitcoins. By April 2019, about 17 million Bitcoins had been issued with its market cap reaching $67.8 billion [3] .
Bitcoin has a certain privacy protection design [1] . In the design of the Bitcoin system, Nakamoto Satoshi took into account the privacy issues, and users can generate unlimited Bitcoin addresses anytime and anywhere, realizing the privacy protection of users. However, such privacy protection is not comprehensive. For example, when a financial company purchases a stock on a large scale by using Bitcoin, it is easy to cause concern of other people, thus affecting the normal market order.
Bitcoin is not a completely anonymous system. All transaction information in the Bitcoin system is fully published on the network and can be used to reveal information about users and transactions. Many studies have shown that attackers can obtain user privacy by analyzing transactions and some real attacks [4] [5] [6] [7] . For example, AddressProbe was introduced to discovers peer-to-peer links in Bitcoin in [7] , the results shows that mining pools are prevalent and hidden, 2% of the (influential) nodes represent three quarters of the mining power.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for providing Bitcoin users a full anonymous service. Bonneau et al. [8] proposed a protocol Mixcoin to introduce a mix service for Bitcoin, which avoids linking the input and output addresses. Luke Valenta and Brendan Rowan put forward the Blindcoin [9] protocol by improving the Mixcoin protocol; it uses a blind signature to guarantee that the mix server cannot extract the link between the input/output addresses. Gregory Maxwell proposed Coinjoin [10] to shuffle the link of the user's address without the intervention of any third party. However, this service is susceptible to DoS attacks. Coinswap [11] was another proposed solution proposed by Gregory Maxwell, which used a third party to assist in trading; its anonymity depends on 2-of-2 escrow transactions. Van Saberhagen has proposed the use of ring signature and stealth address technologies to build an anonymous higher e-cash program, CryptoNote [12] . The verification complexity of a ring signature increases linearly with the anonymity provided. Zerocoin [13] proposes a new type of side chain to provide anonymity for Bitcoin. It is compatible with Bitcoin, but has low system efficiency and performance. Zerocash [14] improves on Zerocoin [13] by using zk-SNARKs noninteractive zero-knowledge proof algorithm [15] to achieve stronger anonymity. However, its security depends on the honest destruction of the system's secret parameters. Coin-Party [16] , based on the concept of Coinjoin, uses threshold ECDSA and decryption mixnets to combine the advantages of centralized and decentralized mixes in a single system. However, it is partially prone to coin theft and DoS attack, high mixing time, and requires separate honest mixing peers. XIM [17] provides a mix service by anonymous interaction and multi-round mixing, but has a higher mixing time.
Our contribution In this paper, we propose a mix service, Lockmix, based on Mixcoin [8] and Blindcoin [9] . It offers a mix service by using blind signature and multi-signature techniques to prevent the mix server from stealing Bitcoins from users. It can also cut off the link between the account input address and the output address. It has anonymity, scalability, accountability, Bitcoin compatibility and anti-theft. In short, Lockmix has all the properties of an ideal solution. Lockmix has been implemented in Go language, and the experiment has been conducted by simulating multiple users. By using a parallel strategy, the experiment results show that our solution is efficient.
Paper organization Background and the relevant system building blocks are presented in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we present the security model and our proposed Lockmix. The analysis and performance are presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Background

Bitcoin privacy issue
Bitcoin is a public chain, where users can join and exit the network at any time without identity authentication. Users can generate any number of Bitcoin accounts to access the network. This mechanism is a kind of pseudonymity, which can provide a degree of privacy protection.
However, its openness means that all Bitcoin transactions are entirely public, and anyone can view the transaction information by connecting Bitcoin to the entire node. Many studies have shown that the link between the user's Bitcoin address and the real identity can be derived from transaction analyses. We list some attack modes.
1. Realistic attack Legal institutions, such as an exchange or a bank that may disclose the user's personal information.
It is requisite for users to exchange Bitcoin for fiat money or to purchase the physical goods by using Bitcoin. In the case, the user's contact information and address need to be known, and the user's true identity will be involved.
Common trading patterns Some trading patterns of Bit-
coin may lead to the disclosure of user privacy. For example, in Fig. 2 , a user may use a merge transaction in multiple addresses to purchase an item, which may reveal information that the addresses belong to the same user. Similarly, a change transaction may also reveal that the change belongs to the same user. 3. Stain attack From the generation of one Bitcoin, all relevant transaction information and addresses can be known by the outside world. These addresses have a high correlation property, and the attacker can obtain relevant information about the user by analysis. Ron and Shamir [4] downloaded the full history of Bitcoin and analyzed many statistical properties of its associated transaction graph; they found in all large-scale system transactions and found almost all of this is closely related to the single block trade that took place in November 2010. Reid and Harrigan [5] proved that multiple pseudonymous addresses could be linked to a single user. 4. Network layer attack While Bitcoin has some privacy protection capabilities at the application layer, not the network layer, it is easier for an attacker to conduct and implement an attack through the network layer [6] . When the network transaction information is transmitted at the Bitcoin network layer, the attacker can directly obtain the related information of the transaction, link the Bitcoin address with the IP address, thereby further real identity is revealed. The attacker can set the probe node to obtain the propagation state of the transaction. If a sufficient number of probe nodes are set, attacker can detect the initiator of a specific transaction. Miller et al. [7] introduced AddressProbe, a technique to discover the Bitcoin's public topology and influential nodes.
The anonymity that Bitcoin systems urgently need to achieve should be a combination of pseudonyms and unlinkability. Unlinkability means that the attacker cannot obtain the link between the user addresses. Specifically, it is hard for an attacker to link together different addresses of the same user and also hard to link together different transactions made by the same user. The attacker cannot connect the payer to the payee. Therefore, designing a complete privacy protection scheme for Bitcoin has become a hot topic in the research of Bitcoin.
Ideal property
For Bitcoin privacy issues, the ideal solution protocol [8, 9] should consider the following attributes. See Sect. 4.1 for comparisons.
-Anonymity The user should be the only entity that knows the link between the input address and the output address. Anonymity is the most core property of the Bitcoin privacy protection protocol. It is necessary to ensure that others cannot know the link between the user address and real identity.
-Scalability An ideal system should have the scalability to support a large number of users. The quality of service should not be reduced when a large number of users are using this system at the same time. The service capability of the system should not decrease the quality of service as the number of users increases. -Accountability (mix service only) When the protocol is not working properly, either party can prove the other party's violations. For example, if the mix server has any illegal operation, the user can produce evidence to prove the violation operation and then proceed to the punishment. -Bitcoin compatibility The privacy protection protocol should be compatible with the existing Bitcoin system. -Resilience to DoS attack The service needs to resist the DoS attack and can resist the malicious user from destroying the entire protocol. -Anti-theft Bitcoin privacy protection protocol often involve the transfer of funds. To ensure that no party can steal Bitcoin from other users, it is necessary to design a mechanism for preventing attackers from stealing Bitcoins.
Blind signatures
In 1982, Chaum first proposed the concept of blind signature [18] . The first efficient blind signature scheme was implemented by Fuchsbauer [19] . Blind signature is a special type of digital signature, which is a mutual protocol. In a general digital signature protocol, the signer knows the content of the signed message. In the blind signature protocol, the original information is blinded by the sender and then sent to the signer; the signer signs the blinded information and returns it to the sender; the sender decrypts the blind factor and finally gets the signer's correct signature of the original information. The signer completes the signature, but he cannot know what he signed and when he signed the message. In general, an ideal blind signature should have the following properties:
-Unforgeability No one other than the signer can generate a valid blind signature on signer's behalf. -Non-repudiation Once the signer has signed a message, he cannot deny his signature on the message. -Blindness Although the signer signed a message, he could not get the content of the message. The blind signature protocol consists of the following three steps, as shown in Fig. 3 .
Blind message The user can blind the message, which
is equivalent to covering carbon paper on the signature paper so that the signer cannot see the contents of the signature paper. There are many ways to blind, such as RSA Blind signature. The method of a random number is used in the signature, and the random number is called the blinding factor. 2. Sign the blind message The signer will blindly sign the message based on the received blinded message. 3. Recovery the signature To get the signature of the real signer, the user needs to recovery the blinded signature. At this point, once the signer denies his signature, the user can take out the signature and prove that it is the official signature of the signer.
The RSA blind signature algorithm uses a random value r and makes gcd (r , n) = 1. The blind message m is obtained by multiplying r e mod n as a blind factor with message m.
At the same time, the blinded message m is sent to the signer. Since r is randomly selected, guaranteeing r e (mod n) is random, so that no information about m will be revealed. The signer then calculates the blinded signature s :
s is sent to the sender of the message, at this point he can remove the corresponding blind factor to reveal the true signature s.
The proof of the correctness of the protocol can be obtained from equation (4).
Generally, the blind signature algorithm is used to sign the hash of the message, because it may result in wasting time and calculation by signing the whole message. Hashing the message to reduce the number of bytes is more efficient and improves the security of signatures.
The blind signature algorithm can also be used to provide unlinkability, which prevents the signer from linking the blinded message to a later un-blinded message. Blind signature schemes can be implemented using several common digital signature schemes, for instance, RSA [20] and DSA [21] .
Multi-signature
Multi-signature [22] is a digital signature scheme that allows a group of users to sign a single transaction. In general, multiple signatures produce a single joint signature, which is more efficient than using different signatures to sign separately. The parties can be individuals, institutions, or programmed scripts [23] .
The multi-signature script in Bitcoin indicates that the Bitcoin in the address must be used to meet certain conditions. It is generally represented by m-of-n, where n means that there are n public keys recorded in the output script, and m indicates when using the funds corresponding to the output script, the user needs to use at least m signatures of n to unlock this address. For example, in the case of 2-of-3, the three public keys are potential signers and require at least 2 users to unlock the funds. Due to the limitations of the Bitcoin script, only up to 15 public keys can be used, so m is no more than 15. If the extension is required, the threshold signature can replace multi-signature, but it is not integrated on the Bitcoin client and requires an additional mechanism to implement.
The format of setting the m-of-n multi-signature in Bitcoin is as follows.
M < Public K ey 1 >< Public K ey 2 > ... < Public K ey N > N C H EC K MU LT I SI G
The 2-of-2 multi-signature format used in this paper is as follows:
This means that only the signature A and signature B corresponding to the public key A and the public key B can be used to unlock the transaction, so that the unlock script is shown below.
The script will be unlocked and the Bitcoin funds can be used only when the two signatures and the two public keys correspond.
In this paper, a 2-of-2 multi-signature system will be used, which means that the assets on the multi-signature address belong to two users. The Bitcoin on the multi-signature address can be used only if both the users sign the transaction.
Tor network
Tor [24, 25] , known as the onion routing anonymous proxy network, is mainly used for privacy protection at the IP layer, preventing attackers from conducting traffic attacks on users and ensuring the user's online anonymity. Tor was originally designed to protect the privacy of users while not being monitored. Users' network activities, such as browsing websites, sending posts, and timely communication, are difficult to track by others.
In the onion routing, information is encrypted at the network layer. It is called onion routing because every node needs to encrypt message by the point-to-point symmetric key. If someone want to know the underlying core information, he needed to strip each layer of the encryption layer. When information pass a client, every intermediate node need to decrypt a layer of encrypted data to know the next destination of the data, and then sends the remaining encrypted data to it. The last relay decrypts the innermost encrypted data and guarantees that the original data is sent to the destination address.
Lockmix protocol
System model
This paper proposes a model based on the mix service, which involves a mix server, the users, and a public log. For under- Mix server It receives one-chunk (one-chunk means the amount of Bitcoin must be the same for all users participating in the mix service each time) money from the user's input address and puts it into the user's output address; the model assumes that there are multiple competing mix servers, which has the corresponding M pub , M priv respectively.
The users The user wants to transfer funds from the input address, which might associate her with her real identity, and she can receive the same money in her new address. In addition, the user needs to pay the money mixing charges for this.
Public log The public log can be viewed as a bulletin board which can be added to but cannot be modified. In fact, it can be viewed as a Bitcoin transaction O P_R E T U R N [26] , which needs fewer Bitcoins.
Typically, the mix server receives the user's funds, mixes these multiple users' funds, and then sends the funds back to the user's newly created address. There are two usual structures, including single centralized mix service and multiple chained centralized mix services. In Fig. 4 , the internal centralized mix server can know the user's private information which is the link between the input address and the output address. The user cannot judge whether the mix server leaks or even sells its own private information. To prevent a single mix server from being compromised or a malicious mix server's leakage behavior, users can perform multiple rounds of privacy protection operations by using multiple mix servers one by one. It is shown in Fig. 5 . However, this will lead to high mixing fees and transaction fees in Bitcoin network, and the time to complete mixing process is greatly increased, which can not meet our expectation.
Based on the centralized mix server model, the Lockmix protocol uses a blind signature algorithm to ensure that the mix server cannot know the link between the user input address and the output address. The multi-signature is used to ensure that the mix server cannot steal the user's funds. The anonymous network Tor guarantees user privacy at the IP layer. The Lockmix model is shown in Fig. 6 . The parameter table is shown in the Table 1 . The general process of the protocol is as follows: First, user A and mix server M complete the deposit process. Next, the mix server M transfers the v Bitcoins into Alice's address k out . User A then confirms receipt of the corresponding Bitcoin and transfers the v Bitcoins from its own address k in to the k esc . If the protocol proceeds normally, User A and mix server M need to construct a 2-of-2 Bitcoin transaction; they need to transfer the transaction fee to the Bitcoin address k M of M, and return the remaining funds to user A's Bitcoin address k in .
Multi-signature guarantees that they can use the funds in the 2-of-2 multi-signature address until both parties agree on the result of the protocol. If the two sides do not reach a consensus, either party will lose the corresponding funds. Therefore, in a rational situation, user A and mix server M will ensure the normal operation of the protocol and negotiate the parameters such as the rate in advance and set the deposit ratio z to prevent the malicious behavior of the attacker.
The Lockmix protocol is divided into the following two steps:
1. The deposit payment phase User A and mix server M construct a 2-of-2 multi-signature address, and User A stores the Bitcoin funds in this address. 2. Mix phase RSA blind signature (not necessarily limited to RSA) is used to hide the link between the input address and the output address. The chunk size ρ
The mixing fee rate that A will pay D The mix parameters, a tuple {v, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 5 , t 6 , t 7 , ω, z, ρ, k A }
Deposit system design
We adopt the 2-of-2 multi-signature algorithm to design the deposit system [22] , see Fig. 7 . User A and the mix server M first jointly generate 2-of-2 multi-signature addresses. The funds in this address only can be used after A and M signing together. Next, the user A sends the Bitcoins into the jointly generated 2-of-2 Bitcoin address, thereby completing the payment process of the deposit. Once the protocol mix process is completed, A and M jointly generate a 2of-2 address transaction, send the transaction fee to the mix server address k M , and return the remaining funds to the A's address k in .
Protocol process
The entire protocol flow is shown below, see Fig. 8 . (1) M announces its expected range of values on the bulletin board, where z is the deposit ratio, v is the chunk size to be mixed, and ω is the number of blocks required to confirm payment. We will discuss how to set these parameters in Sect. 3.4.
(2) A sends the protocol parameters to
Among them, (v, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 5 , t 6 , t 7 , ω, z, ρ, k A ) are disclosed, and k out is blinded, and the information is processed using the A C blindness factor (only A know the inverse A C ).
(3a) M uses k A from A and the k M address, which is generated by itself, to generate a 2-of-2 multi-signature address k AM , and then uses its own private key to sign
(3b) If the mix server rejects the request sent from A, the protocol will terminate, and A will delete the output address.
(4) A transfers the deposit vz from k in to k AM before t 1 time.
(5a) M checks the Bitcoin record whether the transactions in step 4 have been confirmed by ω blocks. If confirmed, M uses the private key to sign [k out ]A C and sends it to the public log before t 2 time.
(5b) If M refuses to proceed with the protocol and does not enter step 5a, A will announce the evidence, which includes {[k out ]A C , k esc , k AM , D}M priv , the transaction (vz, k in , k AM ). Anyone can view the [k out ]A C that did not send a signature to the public log. Therefore, it can be judged that M violated the protocol. However, in our protocol, in case both the sides are rational, there are negligible chances for such a situation to arise, because if M violates the protocol, it will not get any benefit.
(6) When A knows the information in the public log, she will use A C to unblind {[k out ]A C } M priv to generate {k out }M priv the information, and then send it through an anonymous network (such as Tor [27] ) to the public log by t 3 time. Therefore, M can only view its signature on k out address, but it cannot identify the user's corresponding k in address. (7a) M finds the signature k out address in step 6 on the public log and transfers v Bitcoins from k esc to k out within t 4 time.
(7b) If M does not transfer v to k out , A will execute the same operations outlined in step 5b.
(8a) After ω blocks, A confirms that k out address received M's v Bitcoins; she will transfer v Bitcoins from k in to k esc by t 5 time.
(8b) If A does not transfer v to k esc , then the mix server needs to increase z to prevent such malicious attackers. The mix server will lose v Bitcoins. The attackers will lose (zv−v) Bitcoins, so neither of the parties hopes it happens.
(9) A constructs a transaction that transfers vρ Bitcoins from the (zv) Bitcoins in the 2-of-2 multi-signature address to A's k in , and the other (zv − vρ) Bitcoins to the k M , and sends the transaction to M before t 6 time.
(10a) M signs the transaction constructed in step 9 to form the transaction {vρ → M, (zv −vρ) → A}σ A,σ M and then sends it to the Bitcoin network to complete the entire protocol process.
(10b) If M does not sign, A will announce the {[k out ] A C , k esc , k AM , D}M priv and transaction{vρ → M, (zv − vρ) → A}σ A and issue her own transaction hash generated in step 4 and 8a. Anyone can verify whether M violated the protocol. In our protocol, in case M is rational this will not happen, because the Bitcoins in k AM cannot be used without the signatures of both the parties.
Parameter setting
In this section, we will discuss about several key parameters. The setting of these parameters will affect the process of the protocol.
ρ is the fee rate that mix server need to charge. It enables mix servers to profit from honest behavior, which reduces the risk that mix servers stop operations or steal users' funds. In a stable situation, the mix server has two choices, one is to operate honestly, earn revenue for each mix transactions, and the other is to steal funds from address k esc and stop operation. Therefore, the value ρ needs to balance the cost that the mix server can earn in a certain period and the profit that the node steals from the user's funds at a certain time, and ρ is also affected by the competition factors of multiple mix servers.
w is the number of block confirmation in the Bitcoin system. Under normal circumstances, the transaction requires confirmation of six blocks, which means the default information cannot be tampered with. In this paper, the parameters are used to set the block confirmation number according to the needs of different users.
v is the chunk size of Bitcoins that are mixed each round. Because the mix process requires multiple users to participate at the same time, the value of the funds need to be the same. If user A transfers 1 Bitcoin and user B transfers 0.5 Bitcoin, it is easy for an external attacker to link the input address with the output address. Therefore, we propose parameters that need to be negotiated. Users who need to mix the same value can simultaneously perform the mix operation. The excessively Bitcoin value can be split into multiple small funds for mixing.
z is the deposit ratio. The purpose of setting z is to make mix servers to dynamically adjust the size of the deposit according to the actual needs of the market. If the z setting is too small, it may cause malicious competitors to continuously participate in the mix service to execute the protocol to step (6) and then refuse to execute the protocol. If the z setting is too large, it may lead the user to prefer the mix server with a lower deposit ratio, which will cause the mix server to be at a disadvantage in the competition.
Therefore, we propose that the parameter size of z can be dynamically adjusted according to the actual situation of the market. For example, if the value of z is set to 2, a malicious competitor loses the same Bitcoins as the mix server M, and can also perform a denial of service attack in step (8b). For a rational mix server, the benefits of attacking other mix servers are far less than the benefits of legally providing services to collect mix service fees.
Analysis and performance
In this section, the properties, overheads, and fees of Lockmix will be discussed by comparing them with other schemes. We have also proposed a prototype of Lockmix based on the Bitcoin network.
Properties
Lockmix has the requisite properties of an ideal solution.
-Anonymity The anonymity of Lockmix is provided by the blind signature, which makes it impossible to link the input and output addresses. An attacker can only obtain the Bitcoin block transaction information and public log information and cannot figure out the link. -Accountability When one party violates the protocol, all b operations in Sect. 3.3 can ensure the protocol is properly accountable, and each participant can obtain the proof of the offending party's violation. -Scalability With the introduction of a mix server, Lockmix can provide services that correspond with market needs. Adding more users to a mix service is efficient because users interact only with the centralized mix servers and not an individual one. Further, if there is a single point of failure in a mix server, it is easy for the user to turn to other servers. with a 2-of-2 multi-signature, the server cannot steal the deposit because it cannot obtain the signature from the user. Transferring the money to earn the mix fees is the best choice for the server.
In the literature [28] , each property has been discussed and compared with those of other mainstream schemes [8] [9] [10] [11] 13, 14] . For accountability, Mixcoin [8] , Blindcoin [9] , and Lockmix can all present a proof of the mix server's misconduct. For scalability, because of introducing mix servers, Mixcoin [8] , Blindcoin [9] , and Lockmix can easily resist DoS attacks. Coinjoin [10] can be easily broken by malicious participants. Coinswap [11] , being a p2p service, does not have DoS attack problems. Zerocoin [13] and Zerocash [14] designs can provide resistance to DoS attacks. The comparison result is shown in Table 2 .
Overheads and fees
The overheads and fees comparison results are summarized in Table 3 .
Overheads A successful Lockmix mixing operation requires three direct messages between A and M, two messages posted to the public log, three normal Bitcoin transactions, and one multi-signature transaction. Therefore, sixtransaction traffic is needed in the Bitcoin network in total.
Fees Posting messages to the public log costs extra fees, in addition to the fees paid for the funds transfer. According to this source [12] , the typical transaction fee rate is 0.0001 BTC per 1000 bytes. Although the exact message size depends on the implementation, we believe 5000 bytes is a reasonable estimate, for a total cost per message of 0.0005 BTC per message. Overall, the financial cost to the user comprises the mixing fee and the transaction fee. For a chunk size of 0.1 BTC, a fee rate of 0.01, and a transaction fee of 0.0005 BTC per message, the total cost to the user is around 0.002 BTC or 2%, which we believe is a reasonable price to pay for the anonymity benefits.
Performance
The main purpose of our experiment was to measure the efficacy of Lockmix. The experiment was performed on a Dell desktop machine with an Intel Core i5-6500 CPU at 3.20 GHz with 4.00 G of RAM, and running 64-bit windows 10. The program is designed with Go [29] language and runs on the Bitcoin test network. We use the open source projects btcd [30] and btcwallet [31] to build a Bitcoin test network. Btcd [30] is a Bitcoin full node written in Go. It was developed in October 2013 and is licensed under the copyfree ISC license. Btcwallet is the process of a single user Bitcoin wallet. The Go language version is 1.8.4, the Btcd version is 0.12.0-Beta, and the Btcwallet version is 0.7.0-Alpha.
Therefore, we used a parallel strategy to simulate multiple users and tested the runtime to mix Bitcoins in different numbers of users. Without considering the Bitcoin block confirmation time, it takes approximately 140 s for the protocol to serve for 1000 users. The relevant source code was uploaded to GitHub. 1 We use the multi-signature command provided by RPC client in Btcd. At the same time, we uses multi-threading to implement the mix operation to complete the simulation of users' requests.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 9 . It takes about 140s for the protocol to complete 1000 user mix process, 431s for 3000 users, and 669s for 5000 users. The number of users and the total running time are still linear, and the overall mix time increases by the number of users. However, the timing of the entire protocol flow and transaction construction is relatively small relative to the confirmation time of the Bitcoin block. Figure 10 is the complementary cumulative 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present Lockmix, a secure and privacypreserving mix service for Bitcoin anonymity. Lockmix uses a blind signature to hide the link between the user's input and output addresses. Multi-signature can be used as a deposit mechanism, a function already achieved by the Bitcoin system. Lockmix has all the properties of an ideal scheme, such as anonymity, scalability, accountability, Bitcoin compatibility, and anti-theft. Meanwhile, we implemented a prototype of Lockmix, and experiments prove that it can support largescale users and is also very efficient.
